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Abstract
The chest X-ray plays a key role in screening and diagno-
sis of many lung diseases including the COVID-19. More re-
cently, many works construct deep neural networks (DNNs)
for chest X-ray images to realize automated and efficient di-
agnosis of lung diseases. However, bias field caused by the
improper medical image acquisition process widely exists in
the chest X-ray images while the robustness of DNNs to the
bias field is rarely explored, which definitely poses a threat
to the X-ray-based automated diagnosis system. In this pa-
per, we study this problem based on the recent adversarial
attack and propose a brand new attack, i.e., the adversarial
bias field attack where the bias field instead of the additive
noise works as the adversarial perturbations for fooling the
DNNs. This novel attack posts a key problem: how to locally
tune the bias field to realize high attack success rate while
maintaining its spatial smoothness to guarantee high realis-
ticity. These two goals contradict each other and thus has
made the attack significantly challenging. To overcome this
challenge, we propose the adversarial-smooth bias field at-
tack that can locally tune the bias field with joint smooth &
adversarial constraints. As a result, the adversarial X-ray im-
ages can not only fool the DNNs effectively but also retain
very high level of realisticity. We validate our method on real
chest X-ray datasets with powerful DNNs, e.g., ResNet50,
DenseNet121, and MobileNet, and show different properties
to the state-of-the-art attacks in both image realisticity and
attack transferability. Our method reveals the potential threat
to the DNN-based X-ray automated diagnosis and can defi-
nitely benefit the development of bias-field-robust automated
diagnosis system.
1 Introduction
Medical image diagnosis and recognition is starting to be au-
tomated by DNNs with a clear advantage of being very effi-
cient in diagnosing the disease outcomes. However, unlike
human experts, such automated methods based on DNNs
still have some caveats. For example, with the presence
of image-level degradations during the image acquisition
process, the recognition accuracy can be dramatically sup-
pressed. Sometimes, such DNN-based medical image recog-
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Adversarial Bias Field Adversarial Example
ResNet50: Pneumonia
ResNet50: NormalOriginal Input
ResNet50: Normal
ResNet50: Pneumonia
Figure 1: Two cases of our adversarial bias field examples. Our
proposed adversarial-smooth bias field attack can adversarially but
imperceptibly altered the bias field, misleading the advanced DNN
models, e.g., ResNet50, to diagnose the normal X-ray image as
the pneumonia one. More troubling, the DNN could be fooled to
diagnose the pneumonia X-ray image as the normal one, having
higher risk of delaying patients’ treatment.
nition system can even become entirely vulnerable when
maliciously attacked by an adversary or an abuser that is fi-
nancially incentivized.
There are mainly two types of image perturbations or
degradations in medical imagery: (1) image noise, and (2)
image bias field. The image noise is primarily caused by the
image sensor noise and the image bias field is caused by
the spatial variations of radiation (Vovk, Pernus, and Likar
2007), which is very common among medical imaging,
ranging from magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) (Ahmed
et al. 2002), computed tomography (CT) (Li et al. 2008; Guo
et al. 2017c, 2018), to X-ray imaging, etc. The bias field
appears as the intensity inhomogeneity in the MRI, CT, or
X-ray images. For consumer digital imaging, the bias field
shows up as the illumination changes or vignetting effect.
In this work, we want to reveal this vulnerability caused
by image bias field. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
very first attempt to adversarially perturb the bias field, in
order to attack DNN-based X-ray recognition. Contrary to
the additive noise-perturbation attack on DNN-based recog-
nition systems, the attack on the bias field is multiplicative
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in nature (Zheng and Gee 2010), which is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the noise attack. What is more important is that
in order to make the bias field attack realistic and impercep-
tible, the successful attacks need to maintain the smoothness
property of the bias field, which is genuinely more challeng-
ing because local smoothness usually contradicts with high
attack success rates.
To overcome this challenge, we capitalize on this pro-
prietary degradation surrounding X-ray imagery and initi-
ate adversarial attacks based on imperceptible modification
on the bias field itself. Specifically, we have proposed the
adversarial-smooth bias field generator that can locally tune
the bias field with joint smooth and adversarial constraints
by tapping into the bias field generation process based on a
multivariate polynomial model. As a result, the adversarially
perturbed bias field applied to the X-ray image can not only
fool the DNN-based recognition system effectively, but also
retain high level of realisticity. We have validated our pro-
posed method on several chest X-ray classification datasets
with the state-of-the-art DNNs such as ResNet, DenseNet,
and MobileNet, by showing superior performance in terms
of both image realisticity and high attack success rates. A
careful investigation into which bias field region contributes
more significantly to the adversarial nature of the attack can
lead to a better interpretation and understanding of the DNN-
based recognition system and its vulnerability, which, we
believe, is of utmost importance. The ultimate goal of this
work is to reveal that the bias field does pose a potential
threat to the DNN-based automated recognition system, and
can definitely benefit the development of bias-field-robust
automated diagnosis system in the future.
2 Related Work
In this section, we will summarize the related works includ-
ing X-Ray imagery recognition, noise-based adversarial at-
tack and the adversarial attack on medical imagery.
2.1 X-Ray Imagery Recognition
X-ray radiography is widely used in the medical field for
diagnosis or treatment of diseases. In recent years, many
public X-ray image datasets are made available, leading to a
wide literature examining data mining or deep learning tech-
niques on such datasets.
One of the largest datasets is the ChestX-ray14 dataset
from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Clinical Cen-
ter, which contains over 108,948 frontal-view X-ray images
with 14 thoracic diseases, and other non-image features. To-
gether with the dataset, (Wang et al. 2017) evaluates the per-
formance of 4 classic convolutional neural network (CNN),
namely AlexNet, ResNet-50, VGGNet, and GoogLeNet, on
the multi-label image classification of diseases, creating an
initial baseline of average area under the ROC curve (AUC)
of 0.745 over all 14 diseases.
Inspired by this work, many researchers starts utilising the
power of deep neural network on chest X-ray (CXR) classi-
fication. (Li et al. 2017) presents a framework to jointly per-
form disease classification and localisation. With the use of
bounding box to predict lesion area location, the classifica-
tion performance is improved to an average AUC of 0.755.
(Yao et al. 2017) proposes the use of a CNN backbone with
a variant of DenseNet model, combining with a long-short
term memory network (LSTM) to exploit statistical depen-
dencies between labels, achieving an average AUC of 0.761.
(Guan and Huang 2020) explores a category-wise residual
attention learning (CRAL) framework, which is made up of
feature embedding and attention learning module. Different
attention weights are given to enhance or restrain different
feature spatial regions, yielding an average AUC score of
0.816. (Rajpurkar et al. 2017) proposes the use of transfer
learning by fine-tuning a modified DenseNet , resulting in
an algorithm called CheXNet, a 121 layer CNN. It further
raises the average AUC to 0.842. (Guan et al. 2018) presents
the use of a three- branch attention guided CNN, which fo-
cuses on local cues from (small) localized lesion areas. The
combination of local cues and global features achieves an
average AUC achieves 0.871. The state of the art results us-
ing the official spilt released by (Wang et al. 2017) are held
by (Gündel et al. 2018) with average AUC of 0.817. The pa-
per argues that when random spilt is used, the same patient
is likely to appear in both train and test set, and this over-
lap affects performance comparison. The method proposed
is a location aware DenseNet-121, trained on ChestXRay14
data and PLCO dataset, which incorporates the use of spatial
information in high resolution images.
The power of deep learning techniques on CXR is also ex-
plored for detection of COVID-19, motivated by the need of
quick, effective and convenient screening. Studies showed
that some COVID-19 patients displayed abnormalities in
their CXR images. (Wang and Wong 2020) releases an open
access benchmark dataset COVIDx along with COVID-Net,
a deep CNN designed for detection of COVID-19 from CXR
images, achieving a sensitivity of 97.3 and appositive predict
value of 99.7. Many studies have also leverage on variant of
the dataset and network for prediction of COVID-19 (Afshar
et al. 2020; Li and Zhu 2020; Tartaglione et al. 2020).
Despite the strong performance of DNN, and consider-
ations made to address data irregularities like class imbal-
ance in dataset, the effect of medical image degradation on
disease identification was rarely investigated and addressed.
For example, bias field, also referred to as intensity inhomo-
geneity, is a low frequency smooth intensity signal across
images due to imperfections in image acquisition methods.
Bias field could adversely affect quantitative image analy-
sis (Juntu et al. 2005) Many inhomogeneity correction strat-
egy are hence proposed in the literature (Brey and Narayana
1988)(Fan et al. 2003)(Thomas et al. 2005).
However, the possible detrimental effect on disease iden-
tification, location or segmentation by the bias field are
rarely explored in literature, hence DNN proposed may not
be robust towards this inherent degradation. To the best of
authors’ knowledge, this paper is very first work that looks
at the effect of bias field from the view of adversarial attack.
2.2 General Adversarial Attack
Despite the robustness of various DNN deployed in solving
different recognition problems in image, speech or natural
language processing application, many studies have shown
that DNN are susceptible to adversarial attacks (Szegedy
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et al. 2013)(Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014). There
exist many literatures that propose different adversarial at-
tacks (Guo et al. 2020b,c; Wang et al. 2020; Cheng et al.
2020a), and they can be generally classified into attacks in
training and testing stage.
In training stage, attackers can carry out data poison-
ing, which involves the insertion of adversarial example into
training dataset, affecting model’s performance. For exam-
ple, poison frog leverages on inserting images into dataset
to ensure the wrong classification will be given to a target
test sample (Shafahi et al. 2018). The use of direct gradi-
ent method in generating adversarial images against neural
network is also explored (Yang et al. 2017).
In testing stage, attackers can carry out either white-box
or black-box attacks. In white-box attacks, attackers are as-
sumed to have access to target classifier. (Biggio et al. 2013)
focuses on optimising discriminant function to mislead a 3
layer full connected neural network. (Shafahi et al. 2018)
suggests that a certain imperceptible perturbation can be ap-
plied to cause misclassification on image, and this effect can
be transferred to other different network to train on similar
data to misclassify the same input. Fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) is proposed by (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2014). It involves only one back propagation step when
calculating the gradient of cost function, hence allowing
fast adversarial example generation (Kurakin, Goodfellow,
and Bengio 2016) proposes the iterative version of FGSM,
known as basic iteration method (BIM), which heuristically
search for examples that are most likely to fool the clas-
sifier. Given the presence of literature that defends against
FGSM methods, (Carlini and Wagner 2017) proposes the
use of margin loss instead of entropy loss during attacks.
(Cisse et al. 2017) proposes a an approach named HOU-
DINI, which generate adversarial examples for fooling vi-
sual and speech recognition models. Instead of altering pixel
values, spatial transformed attacks are also proposed to per-
form special transformation such as translation or rotation
on images (Xiao et al. 2018).
In black box attacks, attackers have no access to classi-
fier’s parameter or training sets. (Papernot et al. 2017) pro-
poses the exploitation of transferability of adversarial exam-
ples. A model similar to the target classifier is first trained,
then adversarial examples generated to attack the trained
model is used to target the actual classifier. (Fredrikson, Jha,
and Ristenpart 2015) explores the exploitation of knowl-
edge of confidence value of target classifier as predictions
are made.
2.3 Adversarial Attack (and Defense) on Medical
Imagery
There are existing literature that looks into adversarial at-
tack against deep learning system for medical imagery. (Fin-
layson et al. 2018) shows that both black box and white
box PGD attack and adversarial patch attack could affect
the performance of classifiers modelled after state-of-the-
art systems on fundoscopy, chest X-ray and dermoscopy
respectively. Similarly, (Paschali et al. 2018) also shows
that small perturbation can create classification performance
drop across state-of-the-art networks such as Inception and
UNet, for which accuracy drops from above 87% on nor-
mal medical images to almost 0% on adversarial examples.
By producing crafted mask, an adaptive segmentation mask
attack (ASMA) is proposed to fool DNN model for segment-
ing medical imagery (Ozbulak, Van Messem, and De Neve
2019).
In medical adversarial defence, (Li, Pan, and Zhu 2020)
proposes an unsupervised detection of adversarial sam-
ples in which unsupervised adversarial detection (UAD)
are complemented with semi-supervised adversarial train-
ing (SSAT). The proposed model claims to demonstrate a
superior performance in medical defence against other tech-
niques. (Ma et al. 2020) further proposes that medical DNN
are more vulnerable to attacks due to the specific characteris-
tic of medical images having high gradient regions sensitive
to perturbations, and over parameterization of the state-of-
the-art DNN. This work then proposes an adversarial detec-
tor specifically designed for medical image attacks, achiev-
ing over 98% detection AUC.
However, very few literature has leverage on and conduct
adversarial attack based on the inherent characteristic of
the targeted medical imagery. For example, common noise
degradation used for general adversarial attacks are rarely
found in X-ray imagery. Hence in this work, we capitalize
on the proprietary degradation surrounding X-ray imagery,
bias field, and initiate adversarial attacks based on impercep-
tible modification on the bias field itself.
3 Methodology
3.1 Adversarial Bias Field Attack and Challenges
Given a X-ray image, e.g.,Xa, we can assume it is generated
by adding a bias field B to a clean version, i.e., X, with the
widely used imaging model
Xa = XB. (1)
Under the automate diagnosis task where a DNN is used to
recognize the category (i.e., normal or abnormal) ofXa, it is
necessary to explore a totally new task, i.e., adversarial bias
field attack aiming to fool the DNN by calculating an adver-
sarial bias filedB, with which we can study the influence of
the bias field as well as the potential threat of utilizing it to
fool the automate diagnosis.
A simple way is to take logarithm on Eq. 1 and transform
the multiplication to additive operation
Xˆa = Xˆ+ Bˆ, (2)
where we use the ‘ˆ·’ to represent the logarithm of a variable.
With Eq. 2, it seems that all existing additive-based adver-
sarial attacks, i.e., FGSM, BIM, MIFGSM, DIM, and TIM-
IFGSM, could be used for the new attack. For example, we
can calculate Bˆ to realize attack by solving
argmax
Bˆ
J(Xˆ+ Bˆ, y), subject to ‖Bˆ‖p ≤ , (3)
where J(·) is the loss function for classification, e.g., the
cross-entropy loss, and y denotes the ground truth label of
X. Nevertheless, we argue that such solution cannot gener-
ate the real ‘bias field’ since the optimized Bˆ violated the
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Original Input Adversarial ExampleNon-smooth Adv. Bias Field ResNet50: PneumoniaResNet50: Normal
Figure 2: An example of using Eq. 3 to general the non-smooth
adversarial bias field.
basic property of bias field, i.e., spatially smooth changes
resulting in intensity inhomogenity. For example, as shown
in Fig. 2, when we optimize Eq. 3 to produce a bias field, we
can attack the ResNet50 successfully while the bias field is
noise-like and far from the appearance in the real world.
As a result, due to requirement of spatial smoothness of
bias field, the adversarial bias field attack posts a totally new
challenge to the field of adversarial attack: how to generate
the adversarial perturbation that can not only achieve high
attack success rate but maintain its spatial smoothness for
the realisticity of bias field. Actually, since the high attack
success rate relies on the pixel-wise tunable perturbation and
violates the smoothness requirement of bias field, the two
constraints contradicts each other and make the adversarial
bias field attack significantly challenge.
3.2 Adversarial-Smooth Bias Field Attack
To overcome above challenge, we propose the distortion-
aware multivariate polynomial model to represent the bias
field whose inherit property guarantees the spatial smooth-
ness of the bias field while the distortion helps achieve ef-
fective attack. Then, we define a new objective function for
effective attack by combining the constraints of spatially
smooth bias field, sparsity of the original image with the ad-
versarial loss. Finally, we introduce the optimization method
and attack algorithm.
Distortion-aware multivariate polynomial model. We
model the bias filed Bˆ as
Bˆi =
D∑
t=D0
D−t∑
l=D0
at,lTθ(xi)tTθ(yi)l (4)
where Tθ represents the distortion transformation and we
use the thin plate spline (TPS) transformation with θ be-
ing the control points. We denote i as the i-th pixel with
its coordinates (xi, yi) while (Tθ(xi),Tθ(yi)) means the
pixel has been distorted by a TPS. In addition, {at,l} and
D are the parameters and degree of the multivariate polyno-
mial model, respectively, and the number of parameters are
|{at,l}| = (D−D0+1)(D−D0+2)2 . For convenient representa-
tions, we concatenate {at,l} and obtain a vector a.
Adversarial-smooth objective function. With Eq. 4, we
can tune a and θ for adversarial attack and the multivari-
ate polynomial model can help preserve the smoothness of
bias field. Intuitively, on the one hand, the lower degree D
leads to less model parameters |{at,l}| and a smoother bias
field could be obtained. On the other hand, the distortion
(Tθ(xi),Tθ(yi)) can be locally tuned with different θ and
can help achieve effective attack. The key problem is how to
calculate {at,l} and θ to balance the spatial smoothness and
adversarial attack. To this end, we define a new objective
function to realize the attack.
argmax
a,θ
J(Xˆ+ Bˆ(a, θ), y)− λa‖a‖1 − λθ‖θ − θ0‖1,
(5)
where θ0 represents parameters of the identify TPS trans-
formation, i.e., xi = Tθ0(xi). The first term is to tune the
a and θ to fool a DNN for X-ray recognition. The second
term encourages the sparse of {at,l} and would let the bias
field smooth. The final term is to let the TPS transforma-
tion not go far away from the identity version. Two hyper-
parameters, i.e., λa and λθ control the balance between the
smoothness and adversarial attack.
3.3 Optimization
Like the optimization methods used in general adversarial
noise attack, we solve Eq. 3 and 5 via sign gradient descent
where a and θ are updated via fixed rate
at = at−1 + asign(∇at−1), (6)
θt = θt−1 + θsign(∇θt−1), (7)
where ∇at−1 and ∇θt−1 denote the gradient of at−1 and
θt−1 with respect to the objective function in Eq. 5, respec-
tively. For Eq. 3, we use the same to update Bˆ directly. We
fix a = θ = 0.06 with the iteration number being 10.
4 Experiments
In this section, we conduct comprehensive experiments on
a real chest-xray dataset to validate the effectiveness of our
method and discuss how bias field affects X-Ray recogni-
tion. We want to answer the following questions: ¶ What
are the differences and advantages of the adversarial bias
field attack over existing adversarial noise attacks? · How
and why can the bias fields affect the X-ray recognition? ¸
How do the hyper-parameters affect the attack results?
4.1 Setup and Dataset
Dataset. We carry out our experiments on a chest-xray
dataset about pneumonia, which contains 5863 X-ray im-
ages1. These images were selected from retrospective co-
horts of pediatric patient. The dataset is divided into two
categories, i.e., pneumonia and normal.
Models. In order to show the effect of the attack on
different neural network models, we finetune three pre-
trained models on the chest-xray dataset. The three models
are ResNet50, MobileNet and Densenet121 (Dense121).The
accuracy of ResNet50, MobileNet and Densenet121 is
88.62%, 88.94% and 87.82%.
1Please find more details about the dataset in https://www.kaggle.com/
paultimothymooney/chest-xray-pneumonia.
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Metrics. We choose the attack success rate and image
quality to evaluate the effectiveness of the bias field attack.
The image quality measurement metric is BRISQUE (Mit-
tal, Moorthy, and Bovik 2012). BRISQUE is an unsuper-
vised image quality assessment method. A high score for
BRISQUE indicates poor image quality.
Baselines. We select five adversarial attack methods as our
baselines, which include basic iterative method (BIM) (Ku-
rakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016), Carlini & Wagner L2
method (C&WL2) (Carlini and Wagner 2017), saliency map
method (SaliencyMap) (Papernot et al. 2016), fast gradi-
ent sign method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2014) and momentum iterative fast gradient sign method
(MIFGSM) (Dong et al. 2018).
For the setup of hyperparameters of these baselines, we
set them as the default setup of foolbox (Rauber, Brendel,
and Bethge 2017). We set max perturbation to be  = 0.1
relative to [0,1] range in basic experiments. Besides, we set
iterations to be 10 for MIFGSM and BIM.
4.2 Comparison with Baseline Methods
For our method, we set the size of the control points, D and
D0 as (16*16) , 10 and 1, respectively. Table 1 shows the
quantitative results with our method and the baseline meth-
ods, which are conducted with different settings. Specifi-
cally, we conduct two different attacks, i.e., the white-box
attack and the transfer attack. The white-box attack aims to
attack the target DNN directly while the transfer attack at-
tacks the target DNN with the adversarial examples gener-
ated from other models. For example, for the transfer attack
in Table 1, the attack is performed on DNNs in the first row,
and the generated adversarial examples are used to attack
DNNs in the first two columns of the second row.
As we can see, for the white-box attack (i.e., the third col-
umn for each model), we could find that the success rate
of our method is lower than the existing baselines. For ex-
ample, on ResNet50, our method achieves 38.69% success
rate while most of the baselines achieves 100% success rate.
The main reason is that the existing attacking techniques
could add arbitrary noises on the image, which is not re-
alistic. However, our method has a strict smooth limitation
such that the generated adversarial examples look more real-
istic. As shown in Fig. 3, we show some examples generated
by different attacks. The first row shows the original images
while the following rows list the corresponding adversarial
examples. It is clear that our method could generate high-
quality adversarial examples that are smooth and realistic.
In most cases, the change between original image and the
generated image is imperceptible. However, we could find
obvious noises in the adversarial examples generated by the
baseline methods. Such noises are difficult to appear in X-
rays in the real world.
For the transfer attack (i.e., the first two columns), we
found that our method achieves much higher success rate
than others. For example, the attack on ResNet50 achieves
7.57% and 14.05% transfer success rate on MobileNet and
DenseNet121, respectively. However, the the best results of
the baseline are only 1.08% and 0.18%. It is because that
existing techniques calculate the ad-hoc noise, which may
be only effective on the target DNN but not on other mod-
els. However, our attack considers the smoothness such that
the generated adversarial examples are more realistic. Such
adversarial examples are more robust and could reveal the
common weakness of different DNNs (i.e., higher success
rate of the transfer attack). The results indicate that our
method could generate high-quality adversarial examples.
We also compare the image quality with the BRISQUE score
(i.e., the forth column). The results show that our method
could achieve competitive results with the-state-of-the-arts.
In summary, our method aims to generate high-quality
and realistic adversarial examples. To generate such adver-
sarial examples, the attack success rate is naturally lower
than the noise-based adversarial attack techniques.
4.3 Understanding Effects of Bias Field
In this subsection, we aim to explore how the bias field af-
fect the DNN-based X-ray recognition. (Fong and Vedaldi
2017) proposes a method for understanding DNNs with the
adversarial noise attack and generates an interpretable map
indicating the classification-sensitive regions of a DNN. In-
spired this idea, we can study which regions in the chest
X-ray images are sensitive to the bias filed and affect the X-
ray recognition. Specifically, given an adversarial bias field
example Xa generated by our method and the original im-
age X, we can calculate an interpretable map M for a DNN
DNN(·) by optimizing
argmin
M
DNNy(MXa + (1−M)X) (8)
+ λ1‖M‖1 + λ2TV(M)
where DNNy(·) denotes the score at label y that is the
ground truth label of X and TV(·) is the total-variation
norm. Intuitively, optimizing Eq. (8) is to find the region that
causes misclassification. We optimize Eq. (8) via gradient
decent in 150 iterations and fix λ1 = 0.05 and λ2 = 0.2.
With Eq. 8, given a pre-trained model, i.e., DNN(·), and
a dataset X containing the successfully attacked X-ray im-
ages, we can calculate a M for each X-ray image and then
average all interpretable maps to show the statistical regions
that are sensitive to the bias field. For example, we adopt
ResNet50 as the subject model and construct X with 240
attacked X-ray images that can fool ResNet50 successfully.
Then, we calculate the interpretable maps for all images in
X (e.g., the second row in Fig. 4) and average them, achiev-
ing a statistical mean map (e.g., the left image shown in
Fig. 4). According to the visualization results, we observe
that: ¶ Our method helps identify the bias-field-sensitive
regions in each attacked X-ray image and we observe that
these regions are related to the organ positions. This demon-
strates that the effects of the bias field to the DNN stems from
intensity variation around organs. · According to the sta-
tistical mean map, we see that the bias-field sensitive regions
mainly locate at the top and bottom positions across all at-
tacked images, suggesting that future designed DNN should
consider the spatial variations within in X-ray images. We
observe similar results on other DNNs (Please find more re-
sults in the supplementary material), hinting that these are
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Ours
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BIM
Figure 3: Examples of adversarial examples generated with different techniques.
Crafted from ResNet50 Dense121 MobileNet
Attacked model&BRISQUE MobileNet Dense121 ResNet50 BRISQUE ResNet50 MobileNet Dense121 BRISQUE ResNet50 Dense121 MobileNet BRISQUE
BIM 0.36 0 100 30.0249 0.54 0.36 100 29.6599 0 0 100 29.9947
C&WL2 0.36 0 100 30.1128 1.08 0.72 100 29.6455 0 0 100 30.051
SaliencyMap 1.08 0.18 100 28.7108 2.53 1.26 100 28.4046 0.72 0.18 100 30.8351
FGSM 0 0.18 67.8 67.0028 0.72 0.72 29.38 28.5753 0 0 30.09 28.5404
MIFGSM 0.36 0 100 30.0578 0.54 0.36 94.34 29.6094 0 0 100 30.0134
AdvSBF (Ours) 7.57 14.05 38.69 28.5703 7.78 5.95 34.49 28.9535 15.19 19.53 38.92 33.2062
Table 1: Adversarial comparison results on chest-Xray dataset with five attack baselines and our method. It contains the success rates (%)
of transfer & whitebox adversarial attack on three normally trained models: ResNet50, Dense121, and MobileNet. For each four columns,
whitebox attack results are shown in the third one. The first two columns display the transfer attack results. And the last column shows the
BRISQUE score.
common phenomenons in the DNN-based X-ray recognition
and demonstrating the potential applications of this work.
4.4 Effects of Hyper-parameters
We also evaluate the effects of hyper-parameters in our at-
tack, i.e., θ and D in Equation 4. Specifically, we change
θ for TPS transformation by changing the number of con-
trol points. (gridsize × gridsize) is denoted to represent
the control points in the TPS transformation. Then we select
different gridsize to conduct the attack. For the parameter
D, we set the fixed D as 10 and change the value of D0, i.e.,
observe part of the sample display of the bias field by ig-
noring the lowest D0 degree in the multivariate polynomial
model.
Table 2 shows the results with different configurations.
In the second row, we fix the D0 as 0 and change value of
gridsize as 4, 8, 12 and 16, respectively. As we can see, it
seems that there is no clear difference in the attack success
rate when the parameter gridsize varies. We conjecture that
the attack could easily reach the upper bound in terms of
the success rate with different gridsize. Figure 5 shows the
bias field change with different gridsize in multiple itera-
tions. Intuitively, we can see that when gridsize is smaller,
more parts of the image can be adjusted in each iteration
and the image may become less smooth. However, when the
gridsize is becoming larger, there are more grids, which
could provide more fine-grained change. Thus the generated
image can be more smooth.
Then we fix the gridsize as 16 and change the parame-
ter D0 as 0, 1, 2 and 3 (in the third row). As we can see, as
D0 increases (i.e., more lower degree are ignored), the suc-
cess rate of our method decreases and the BRISQUE score
decreases. It is reasonable as ignoring more low degree in
Equation 4 may reduce the space of the manipulation, result-
ing in higher image quality and lower attack success rate.
The visualization results are shown in Fig. 6. When more
6
(gridsize, gridsize), D0
ResNet50 Dense121 MobileNet
MobileNet Dense121 ResNet50 BRISQUE ResNet50 MobileNet Dense121 BRISQUE ResNet50 Dense121 MobileNet BRISQUE
(4,4), 0 10.84 15.33 37.97 32.4873 14.65 8.29 31.39 31.331 21.52 20.44 35.68 34.9368
(8,8), 0 9.91 14.05 37.79 32.5778 13.2 6.49 31.57 31.3609 21.7 20.26 35.68 34.0957
(12,12), 0 9.73 14.23 37.61 32.097 12.84 6.49 31.2 31.9176 21.7 20.44 35.86 34.3194
(16,16), 0 10.81 14.42 38.34 32.3661 13.56 6.85 31.02 31.4455 21.34 20.26 36.04 34.0944
(16,16), 1 11.35 13.5 36.89 31.3312 14.65 9.37 32.12 30.6853 17 19.34 32.79 31.7842
(16,16), 2 8.11 7.85 29.48 29.0977 12.84 8.83 26.09 30.0223 12.12 11.86 26.85 29.5885
(16,16), 3 4.15 2.19 18.81 28.606 4.7 4.68 16.24 29.0152 4.7 3.47 15.32 29.2909
Table 2: Adversarial comparison results on chest-Xray dataset with different setup of hyper-parameters in our method. It contains the success
rates (%) of transfer& whitebox adversarial attacks. For each model, the first two columns display the blackbox attack results, the third one
shows the attack results and the last column shows the BRISQUE score.
Figure 4: Pipeline and examples of exploring bias-field-sensitive
regions. A subject model, i.e., ResNet50, is employed to generate
adversarial bias field examples for 240 X-ray images and we then
use Eq. 8 to produce the interpretable mapM for each image (i.e.,
the images at the second row where the maps are blended with the
raw X-ray images for better understanding.). Finally, we can calcu-
late an averaging map covering all interpretable maps and blend it
with raw images (i.e., the images at the third row.)
lower degree is ignored (i.e., larger D0), the bias field sam-
ples tend to be less smooth.
5 Conclusions
Deep learning has been used in chest X-ray image recogni-
tion for the diagnosis of lung diseases (e.g., COVID-19). It
is especially important to ensure the robustness of the DNN
in this scenario. To tackle this problem, this paper proposed
a new adversarial bias field attack, which aims to generate
more realistic adversarial examples by adding more smooth
perturbations instead of noises. We demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of our attack on the widely used DNNs. The results
show that our method can generate high quality adversarial
examples, which achieve high success rate of the transfer at-
tack. The generated realistic images can reveal issues of the
DNN, which calls for the attention of robustness enhance-
ment of the deep learning-based healthcare system.
In the future, we will extend the adversarial bias field at-
tack to other computer vision tasks, e.g., natural image clas-
sification (Guo et al. 2020b), face recognition (Wang et al.
2020), visual object tracking (Guo et al. 2020c,a, 2017a,b;
Zhou et al. 2017), etc., and also in tandem with other at-
tack modalities that are not based on additive noise in nature
such as (Gao et al. 2020; Cheng et al. 2020b; Zhai et al.
2020). In addition, we can regard our adversarial bias field
(4,4)
(16,16)
(12,12)
(8,8)
i=1 i=2 i=5i=4i=3
Figure 5: Effects of the multivariate polynomial model with differ-
ent control points (i.e., gridsize). The first column shows the size
of control points. The following columns show the bias fields that
are generated by iteratively changing the position of control points.
D : 20D : 00 D : 30D : 10
Figure 6: Effects of the multivariate polynomial model with differ-
ent number of degrees, i.e., D0 and D in Eq. 4.
as a new kind of mutation for DNN testing (Xie et al. 2019a;
Ma et al. 2018b; Du et al. 2019; Xie et al. 2019b; Ma et al.
2018a, 2019).
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